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Bringing Historical Sociology and Path-Dependence 
Together: A Case Study of the Brazilian Political 
Economy (1930-2000) 
Luciana de Souza Leão ∗ 
Abstract: »Zur Zusammenführung von historischer Soziologie und Pfadabhän-
gigkeit: Eine Fallstudie der politischen Ökonomie Brasiliens (1930-2000)«. His-
torical sociology and path-dependence theory both try to understand how 
change and continuity interact in long-term social processes. Even so, there is 
still a lot of uncertainty on the ways that the two methodologies can be adopt-
ed together. This paper addresses this question by studying 70 years of interac-
tion between the state and the market in Brazil. Particularly, it shows how an 
understanding of the historical process that characterized modernization from 
above in Brazil sheds light on the argument that, despite de facto changes in 
the country’s politico-economics in the 1990s, there is still a strong influence 
from the state institutions formulated during the 1930s. The paper discusses 
the main economic, political and administrative changes in state structures 
that happened over 70 years to provide new insights into the ways in which the 
historical perspective can contribute to the interpretation of the period of re-
forms in Brazil. 
Keywords: historical sociology, path-dependence, state, political economy. 
1.  Introduction1 
The idea conceived during the Vargas era, that only the state could be the ar-
chitect of the Brazil’s economic modernization, is the basis of the historical 
pattern of interaction between the state and the market in Brazil. During the 
Republican period, this pattern remained constant – both in democratic (1889-
1937 and 1945-1964) and dictatorial (1937-1945 and 1964-1985) regimes, until 
the 1980s economic crisis when the concept of state interventionism started to 
be questioned. Throughout the 1990s, different measures, like privatization and 
trade liberalization were adopted to try to break away from this historical pat-
tern. However, today, 20 years after the introduction of these market-oriented 
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reforms in Brazil, we can still observe strong interventionist economic policies 
coexisting with liberal policies. 
This paper argues that the current scenario can only be understood if we 
analyze the historical trajectory that characterizes the relationship between the 
state and the market in Brazil. I adopt a historical perspective and I employ 
ideas related to the concept of path-dependence to show: how the notion that 
only the state can determine the appropriate ways for the country to develop 
economically and socially was reproduced through time; and the dynamics of 
change involved in this historical process. Existing literature has already ex-
plored how some political legacies, like clientelism or corporativism, have 
made it difficult for Brazil to adopt neoliberal policies. The objective of this 
paper is to highlight the historical process by which these institutional legacies 
have operated, both as constraints and as strategic resources for political actors 
as they responded to political and economic changes. 
In analyzing this long-term social process, I also highlight the gains to be 
had by using concepts derived from path-dependence theory, like learning 
effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations to complement socio-
historical analysis. I argue that the combination of these historical methodolo-
gies can provide powerful insights on the ways that sociologists analyze change 
and continuity. 
Secondary sources and different economic and political longitudinal indica-
tors are used in this research, which is divided into four main periods: 1930-
1945; 1946-1964; 1964-1985 and 1985-2000. The analysis emphasizes the 
major political, administrative and economic characteristics of each period, and 
shows how the historical choices made consolidated mechanisms that, in the 
long run, guaranteed the priority of state authority over market mechanisms in 
Brazilian politico-economics. By demonstrating how this historical process 
unfolded over time, this paper intends to avoid erroneous notions of historical 
inevitability, that is, interpretations that look at the final form of institutions 
and to the past for explanations, as if they were the only logical ones possible 
(Pierson 2004; Tilly 1984). 
The paper is organized in three sections. In the first, I provide an overview 
of the two theoretical perspectives explored in this study, historical sociology 
and path-dependence theory, giving special focus to their analytical comple-
mentarities. The second and third sections focus on the historical process that 
consolidated the basis of the interaction between the state and the market in 
Brazil and on the attempts to change this pattern in the 1990s. The final section 
presents an overview of the article and suggestions for further research possi-
bilities based on the combination of historical sociology and path-dependence 
literature. 
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2.  Studying Long-Term Social Processes: Historical 
Sociology and Path-Dependence 
The search for explanations of long-term social processes has been a persistent 
challenge in the social sciences. From the work of the authors that are consid-
ered the founders of modern sociology (Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Tocque-
ville), social scientists have grappled with questions related to long-term social 
change, like processes of industrialization, bureaucratization and democratiza-
tion (Abrams 1980; Skocpol 1984). Historical sociology builds on this tradition 
and is devoted to exploring long-term social processes that are considered to be 
transforming our world today (Tilly 1984). 
Classical studies in this field started as a reaction to the a-historical tenden-
cies present in American sociology in the 1950s and 1960s, when debate on 
modernization was dominated by theories that focused on the necessary stages 
that societies had to pass through in order to modernize. This agenda had the 
universalist aspiration of finding relationships among causal variables that one 
would expect to hold across a wide range of settings, independently of tem-
poral and spatial specificities (Pierson 2004). This understanding implied in a 
static view of societal change, one that conceived modernization as a smooth 
transition from a declining tradition to a rising modernity, without any explicit 
concern for the dynamics of change (Bendix 2007). 
In contrast to this perspective, classical studies in historical sociology pro-
pose a historically grounded analysis as an alternative to the timeless, placeless 
models of social change and social organization. According to Skocpol (1984, 
1-2), truly historical sociology studies can be identified as having the following 
characteristics: (i) they ask questions about social structures or processes un-
derstood to be concretely situated in time and space, (ii) they address processes 
over time, and take temporal consequences seriously in accounting for out-
comes, (iii) they deal with the interplay of meaningful actions and structural 
contexts, and (iv) they do not see the world’s past as a set of standardized se-
quences, being understood instead as a sum of contingent factors. 
Although they share the characteristics listed by Skocpol, authors who adopt 
a historical perspective in fact contribute to a sprawling literature characterized 
by tremendous internal diversity (Thelen 1999). The approach adopted in this 
paper is mainly inspired by the work of Reinhard Bendix (2007), whose pro-
posal of studying social change based on the analytical division between au-
thority and solidarity, and his reformulation of the concepts of tradition and 
modernity are especially relevant to my research interests. 
Bendix builds his analysis of social change on the notion that modernization 
should be studied as a continuous process in which traditional and modern 
elements interact in unique ways in each society. In his view, the analytical 
contrasts between features of an earlier social structure (for example, the tradi-
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tional society) and a later one (the modern) need to be seen as conceptual in-
struments that should always be considered in the light of the empirical evi-
dence. In other words, Bendix understands that modernization can only be 
understood as an ideal typical process, since what exist are singular processes 
of modernization that combine traditional heritage with modern acquisition in 
unique ways (Reis 1998). 
Additionally, Bendix points to the difference between processes of moderni-
zation in advanced and follower societies. In his words (2007, 412-3),  
the economic and political ‘breakthrough’ which occurred in England and in 
France at the end of the eighteenth century, put every other country of the 
world in a position of ‘backwardness’ (…). Ever since the world has been di-
vided into advanced and follower societies. 
According to the author, modernizing experiences of follower societies will 
always be determined by this “backwardness” condition – this is why in these 
societies governments attempt to play a major role as modernizing agents, and 
it is common for political groups to stay in power for extended periods of time. 
As we will see, these points correlate directly with the Brazilian experience. 
This methodological approach inspired in Bendix has three immediate im-
plications for this research in particular and to understanding long-term social 
processes in general. First, it takes the state as the main object of analysis,2 
treating it as a social actor, and not as a mere reflection of the social structure 
or economic forces (Skocpol 1985; Reis 2009). Second, the idea that the study 
of social change cannot be based on simple “before-and-after” models implies 
that we should expect to identify changes and continuities interacting simulta-
neously in any changing societal arrangement. Finally, as the development of 
the national state is seen as a dynamic process rather than a historically limited 
event (Reis 1979), the timing and sequence of events are central to understand-
ing the unfolding of social processes. This is why in the remaining part of this 
section I will present how the insights brought by the concept of path-
dependence can complement the historical sociology approach. 
As already noted by many authors, path-dependence has become a faddish 
concept, which is usually invoked, but rarely explained (Pierson 2004; Thelen 
1999; Mahoney 2000). 
This concept, imported from economic theory (David 1985; Arthur 1989), is 
used to describe historical processes in which initial events (critical junctures) 
set into motion specific trajectories or event chains that reinforce the initial 
path chosen, which is then difficult to change. A crucial feature of path-
dependent processes is that they generate self-reinforcing mechanisms (or 
                                                             
2  What is referred to as the “state” is a set of organizations based on the legitimate monopoly 
over violence, the public nature of their action, and the authoritative enforcement of deci-
sions in particular territory. 
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positive feedback), which implies that each step taken in a particular direction 
makes it more difficult to reverse a course (Pierson 2004). 
According to Thelen (2003), the idea of path-dependence proposed by eco-
nomic theory is attractive to other social sciences because it considers the fact 
that social life involves some elements of choice (like choosing a preferred 
technology for economics), but that, once a path is taken and relevant actors 
adjust their strategies to accommodate this pattern, other viable alternatives 
become increasingly remote. In other words, the concept of path-dependence is 
interesting because it raises questions about the temporal relationship between 
structure and action in any social order. 
Users of the concept of path-dependence, however, tend to fluctuate be-
tween broader and narrower interpretations of the term (Streeck and Thelen 
2005). The concept may be used just to indicate that “history matters” or that 
“past legacies affect the choices of the present”. Under this loose definition, the 
concept is used to stress the limited space for innovation that actors have in 
political and social settings, even in many periods of reform – a perspective 
usually adopted to contrast functionalist and utilitarian theories that view insti-
tution building as being solely related to the construction of an efficient struc-
ture of incentives. Little or no attention is given to the temporal and dynamic 
aspects of the historical trajectories. 
There are, however, more strict definitions that consider path-dependence as 
“specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into 
motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” 
(Mahoney 2000, 1), which give more importance to the ways in which path-
dependent processes evolve through time. Authors who adopt this interpreta-
tion usually draw a sharp distinction between high levels of contingency and 
unpredictability in the initial events that are followed by long periods of repro-
duction and continuity in trajectories (Thelen 1999). Using this definition, path-
dependence is related more to continuity than to change, even when authors try 
to avoid deterministic explanations (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004). 
In my view, the great strength of the path-dependence literature lies in the 
way that it incorporates matters of timing and sequencing into the analysis, 
looking specifically at the high level of contingency ex ante and different op-
tions available at initial events. It is less effective, however, in specifying the 
mechanisms of endogenous change in social structures, i.e. in highlighting the 
interaction between change and continuity typical of long-term social processes 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005). In this paper, besides considering matters of timing, 
sequencing and contingency, I use concepts derived from path-dependency 
theory, like learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations to 
help explain the difficulties encountered by the Brazilian state in adopting 
market-oriented policies in the 1990s. 
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The gains to be had by using these concepts to complement historical soci-
ology analysis are enormous, and in this paper I explore in detail two analytical 
complementarities that I believe are more promising: 
(a) Contingency and sequencing: although historical sociologists usually de-
termine an initial period from when they start their interpretations of long-term 
causalities (Tilly 1975; Bendix 2007), it is path-dependence theorists that ex-
plore in detail the notion of multiple equilibria and contingency of initial 
events in historical trajectories (Mahoney 2000). By bringing to the analysis 
concepts related to collective action, rational choice and marginal effects, ana-
lysts that work with path-dependence sophisticate the argument of how differ-
ent equilibriums in social structures emerge. 
On the other hand, historical sociology gives special attention to the possi-
bilities and limits of bounded change in historical trajectories that are essential 
to avoid the logical consequences of process determinism that often emerge in 
path-dependence explanations (Thelen 1999). In general, these studies attribute 
the possibility of change only to exogenous effects and are not able to identify 
the mechanisms of reproduction and changes as well as historical sociologists 
do. In a few words, the combination of path-dependence’s good definition of 
initial contingency combined with historical sociology’s use of sequencing and 
possibilities of change in trajectories can enhance our analysis of long-term 
social processes.3 
(b) Learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations: the im-
plications of continuing use and repetition; the fact that initial choices create 
coordination effects that encourage/discourage particular actions; and the self-
fulfilling character of expectations are fundamental to understand continuity in 
long-term processes (Pierson 2003). These are all concepts imported from 
economic theory that provide valuable insights to historical analysis and should 
be explored by sociology to enhance our understanding of long-term processes 
(Arthur 1989). They are particularly important to understand how different 
institutional legacies have operated both as constraints and as strategic re-
sources for political actors as they responded to political and economic changes 
in different historical settings. Political scientists have consistently used these 
concepts in their analysis, but historical sociology is still beginning to fully 
recognize their benefits to understand changing societal arrangements. 
In the next section, I will present one attempt to combine the strengths of 
historical sociology and path-dependence. In exploring the interaction between 
the state and the market in Brazil over an extended period of time (1930-2000), 
I demonstrate how process-oriented analysis is fundamental to understand the 
current interaction between liberal and interventionist economic policies in the 
Brazilian political economy. 
                                                             
3  One interesting study that implements this combination of the two methodologies is the 
work of Abram DeSwaan “In care of the state”. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988. 
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3.  Understanding Continuity and Change in Brazilian 
Political Economy – The National State as the Main 
Actor, 1930-1985 
The historical relationship between the state and the market in Brazil is charac-
terized by strong patterns of state intervention in the economy. From the 1930s 
onward, the state played a key role in the chosen developmental strategy, and 
state capitalism was perceived as the most legitimate model for combating 
underdevelopment and promoting social inclusion (Martins 1988; Reis 1998). 
Over the 55 years I analyze in this section, this pattern proved to be incredibly 
resilient and resistant to change, even in the face of huge historical changes, 
including the implementation of two dictatorial regimes, significant economic 
modernization and rapid industrialization. 
The objective of this section is to show how the pattern, implemented during 
the Vargas era, which gave priority to state authority over market mechanisms, 
was consolidated over time and to suggest how it was influenced by the way 
modernization and state-making processes proceeded thereafter. To do so, I 
have divided the analysis into three sub-periods (reflecting three different polit-
ical regimes): 1930-1945, 1945-1964, 1964-1985, and I highlight the main 
political, administrative and economic characteristics of each period that al-
lowed state authority to shape the development of the market economy in Bra-
zil, even in the face of major socio-economic and political changes. 
3.1  The Vargas Era (1930-1945): The Beginning of a New Order in 
Brazil 
During the 15 years of the first Vargas government (1930-1945), important 
political and institutional mechanisms were institutionalized that ushered in a 
new period of statebuilding and a new pattern of interaction between the state 
and the market in Brazil, which was characterized by state intervention in the 
economy and by the centralization of political and administrative institutions 
(Nunes 1997). 
The changes that the Brazilian state underwent during this period initiated a 
process of modernization from above that would be reproduced until the 1980s. 
Although this specific type of social change (from top down) involves an in-
crease in political and economic differentiation, it does not imply a real break 
with the past. In this scenario, a strong state becomes the leading agent of mod-
ernization because it is the only actor able to conciliate the old and the new 
orders. The usual dynamics associated with this type of national modernization 
are the denial of class conflict, the co-optation of social groups, the promotion 
of economic development and the rationalization of government administration 
HSR 38 (2013) 2  │  179 
(Reis 1979; Sola 1998). In Brazil, this process was initiated in 1930 and 
strengthened under the Estado Novo (1937-1945) dictatorial regime. 
In the political sphere, the changes that the state underwent during the Var-
gas period were reflected in the processes of political centralization and con-
centration of power. The early provision of social policies and the implementa-
tion of the corporatist system allowed the public authority to act as a 
centralized agent of social control (Schmitter 1971). With this strategy, the 
state could control the political incorporation of new political actors created by 
industrialization (mainly urban workers) and also guaranteed that the represen-
tation of interests would be conducted under state tutelage, and as such also 
served as an instrument of economic regulation (Diniz and Boschi 2004; 
Boschi and Lima 2001; Santos 1979). 
The multiple functions resulting from the strategy of labor incorporation in-
to the system were an important part of the authoritarian path to modernization 
initiated in the Vargas era. By acting as the workers’ benefactor, the state se-
cured a source of support independent of the dominant economic interests, 
which would prove to be of fundamental importance in future years (Vianna 
1978). The corporatist system also served to help support the strategy of mod-
ernization from above. By placing the national will above class interests and 
justifying the need for a strong government to implement social harmony, 
corporatist doctrine was central to legitimizing the strengthening of the state 
observed in this period (Schmitter 1971; Reis 1979; Schwartzman 1982). 
The new role expected from the state required the creation of a set of legal 
norms governing the corporatist system and the policy of pre-emptive co-
optation, and demanded that state institutions be created to perform these tasks. 
Therefore, the process of political centralization was accompanied by a process 
of bureaucratic expansion, which was reinforced during the 55 years analyzed 
in this section (Nunes 1997). In terms of state-building, the growth of the bu-
reaucratic state apparatus during the period clearly points to a significant in-
crease in the process of authority centralization, which may be understood as 
the result of the central government’s attempt at greater control over the politi-
cal and economic decision-making processes (Reis 1979). 
The expansion of the state administrative machine resulted in an increase in 
size of the public sector, and was also decisive in the elaboration and imple-
mentation of decisions at the economic level. The role of the state as a catalyst 
for economic growth stemmed from indirect and direct action. Indirect action 
involved the creation of several government agencies designed to regulate, 
control and supervise many productive sectors that were considered necessary 
for Brazil’s economic development. Direct state action resulted in the creation 
of many national state companies, including two that would become future 
players in Brazil’s industrial development, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional 
and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Wirth 1973, Diniz 1978). These measures 
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contributed significantly to the state’s gradual move towards greater control of 
the economic decision-making process. 
By the end of the Vargas era, in 1945, the Brazilian state was quite different 
from the one that had existed in the Old Republic (1889-1930). A centralized 
state administrative machine had substituted the former federalist and liberal 
government arrangement, a state controlled technocratic system had been put in 
place, a corporatist system had been institutionalized and greater control of the 
economy had been achieved. In short, a modern state with centralized control 
over Brazilian territory and with solid institutionalized means of action had 
been established for the first time in the country’s history. 
However, when compared to other states in late-developing countries of that 
time, or to what the Brazilian state would eventually become, the state in 1945 
still had limited capabilities. Kohli (2005) points to the fact that the state 
formed by Vargas still had limited powers to direct Brazil’s development, 
because it was present mainly in urban areas and failed to penetrate and incor-
porate the vast agrarian periphery, because it remained dependent on foreign 
resources and technology, and because the economy was based primarily on 
agricultural commodities. 
Even so, if we consider Bendix’s approach, we should expect to identify 
changes and continuities interacting simultaneously in the Brazilian state, espe-
cially in the initial stages of social change. The Vargas era symbolizes the 
beginning of the transformation of the state, as part of a continuous historical 
process. If we consider a “fully modern” state, without any traditional traces, as 
an abstraction without sociological meaning, then the focus of our analysis 
must be the study of the dynamics and direction that state transformation has 
taken in different periods. Hence, the choice of using the Vargas era as the 
starting point (or critical juncture) of a period when the state was the main 
modernizing agent is justified by the fact that political actors, in later periods, 
used the institutional foundations created by Vargas to shape their own strate-
gies, designed to reinforce the preference of state authority over market or 
societal mechanisms. 
The historical importance of the institutions created in 1930 lies in the role 
they played in shaping the economic and political development of Brazil in the 
process of modernization from above (Sola 1998; Boschi 2010b). The perma-
nence of these institutions, even in the face of major political and social 
change, is testimony to their resistance and flexibility. I will now consider how 
these dynamics proceeded in the period of democracy, between 1946 and 1964. 
3.2  Democracy and Continuity: 1945-1964 
In 1945, Vargas was overthrown by the military, and democracy was re-
established in Brazil. However, contrary to what one would expect, the state, as 
institutionalized during the Vargas era, was not dismantled with the return of a 
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democratic regime. On the contrary, the role of state authority as the leading 
agent of national modernization was reinforced (even if different mechanisms 
were adopted), and the main institutions and legislation from the previous 
period were left untouched. The only real change was that certain Estado Novo 
measures, limiting civil rights, were eliminated (Nunes 1997; Diniz 1978). 
In terms of the political arrangement, it was the maintenance of the corporat-
ist structure that guaranteed the continuity of state leadership, and thus there 
was a high level of state social control over political groups, even with the 
return to democracy. With this strategy, the state was able to maintain its au-
tonomy and control over economic and political decision-making processes in 
the same way that it had done during the Vargas era (Oliveira 1973; Diniz and 
Boschi 2004). More problematic for the implementation of a pluralistic system 
of representation, however, was the fact that the corporatist structure continued 
to serve as the basis for any new political parties created, thus eliminating any 
chance of establishing a strong parliamentary system (Campello de Souza 
1990). Finally, the clearly populist character of the new regime, which concen-
trated power in the office and figure of the President, allowed the state to con-
tinue to act as the main agent of social control and centralized power, limiting 
the independent political participation of a number of political actors in the 
process of national modernization (Weffort 2003; Sola 1998). 
Similarly, in the administrative sphere, the proliferation of government 
agencies associated directly with the Executive, together with the process of 
bureaucratic insulation, allowed the central government to maintain a high 
degree of autonomy in the economic decision-making process, and to avoid the 
possible pitfalls and delays associated with democratic decision-making (Nunes 
1997, Diniz 1978, Sola 1998). Moreover, there was indirect expansion of the 
state machine during this period through the creation of agencies with overlap-
ping jurisdictions and interests that served mainly to consolidate a pattern initi-
ated in the Vargas period in which public authority became the major employer 
outside the agrarian sector, favoring the state’s co-optation of social interests 
(Camargo 1982; Draibe 1985; Schmitter 1971). This combination of a few 
highly insulated and influential agencies, responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of economic policy and the expansion of indirect state appa-
ratus, allowed the state to assume a variety of functions and directly shape the 
development of Brazil. 
The high degree of state autonomy in the political and administrative 
spheres could also be observed in the economic arena. During the democratic 
period, the contours of a strong developmental state were drawn (Schneider 
2000), and direct intervention of the state in the economy increased significant-
ly. Throughout the 1950s, many state enterprises were created in a number of 
infrastructure areas to avoid possible bottlenecks in Brazil’s industrialization 
process (including petroleum, electricity, public transportation and telecommu-
nications), giving the central government experience in organizing massive, 
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technologically difficult projects – a know-how that would improve state capa-
bilities in future years. The Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDE) was 
established in 1952 to provide finance for these new state enterprises, and for 
the development of national private companies. This process allowed the state 
to control the majority of long-term credit to industry (Giambiagi et al. 2005; 
Baer et al. 1973; Evans 1979). These plural initiatives gave the state a powerful 
lever with which to shape and direct the process of capital accumulation. 
It is important to stress that the nationalist ideology, and an increase in the 
state’s general involvement in the economy during this period, did not mean 
that international capital and private companies were excluded from the devel-
opmental model. On the contrary, the industrialization model, based on import 
substitution (ISI) and designed to boost the presence of private national firms in 
the consumption goods sector, was dependent on international capital to fi-
nance the huge investments necessary and to import the essential technologies 
(Evans 1979, Schmitter 2000). This interaction between state, local capital and 
multinationals – the triple alliance – although fundamental for rapid industrial 
and economic growth, was also responsible for the high inflation and the bal-
ance-of-payment difficulties that characterized this period (Kohli 2005). 
The proliferation of economic plans and price control policies – symbols of 
the idea that state resources should be used to organize and control the market – 
also enabled the state to maintain its leadership during this period. A number of 
economic plans (President Kubistchek’s Plano de Metas in particular) were 
important because they allowed the state to choose which sectors were funda-
mental for Brazil’s development, thus politicizing capital accumulation. Price 
control policies were designed to control inflation by artificially fixing prices in 
the market, but they were not successful in controlling inflation during this and 
future periods (Abreu 1989). 
During the period of democracy, therefore, the process of modernization 
from above continued to unfold, even when other societal and market forces 
could have played a more important role in determining Brazil’s development. 
This developmental model was allowed to continue despite the political regime 
change because of (i) the maintenance of the corporatist structure, (ii) the bu-
reaucratic insulation and expansion of the state administrative machine, and 
(iii) an increase in state interventionism in the economic arena. These mecha-
nisms of continuity were based on the institutional foundations created during 
the Vargas era and were used by political actors to reinforce their preference 
for state authority vis-à-vis market or societal mechanisms. As we will see in 
the next subsection, the same institutional scheme first reinforced then drained 
the state leadership during the military dictatorship. 
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3.3  Military Period (1964-1985): Strengthening and Breakdown of 
the Model 
In 1964, a dictatorial regime was re-established in Brazil. For the first time in 
the country’s history, the armed forces took direct control of all state functions, 
and suppressed most civil and political rights. During this period, a strategy of 
maintaining high economic growth rates was used to legitimize the regime, and 
the civil and military bureaucracies were given the responsibility for imple-
menting it. Moreover, the normative and entrepreneurial roles of the state were 
strengthened, and an increase in its capacity to raise revenues and centralized 
decision-making capacities were achieved (Martins 1985). 
During the military dictatorship, the process of modernization from above, 
initiated during the Vargas era, reached its peak and then collapsed. In terms of 
its apogee, the processes of political and administrative centralization and state 
interventionism continued to develop, resulting in a high degree of institutional 
continuity. As in previous periods, enormous power was concentrated in the 
Executive (with the difference that competitive politics had now been com-
pletely eliminated) and the corporatist structure still served the purpose of 
maintaining state control over urban groups and eliminating any form of volun-
tary organization that might constitute an independent political force (Skidmore 
1973). 
In the administrative and economic spheres, the network of state corpora-
tions and regulatory agencies, created by Vargas and expanded during the 
democratic period, were still firmly in place and bureaucratic insulation was 
reinforced, with highly-qualified civilian staff working closely with the military 
in defining policies. These measures, together with an exponential expansion of 
the public sector and the state administrative machine, allowed the state to 
direct all major economic and social activities. 
During the military dictatorship, the number of State firms expanded enor-
mously through two distinct mechanisms (Evans 1979; Trebat 1983). Firstly, 
state-owned enterprises created in the 1940s, which had now reached maturity, 
were expanded through the creation of holding companies and subsidiaries, like 
Siderbrás, Eletrobrás, Petroquisa, Braspetro, among others. Secondly, many 
firms were created in productive sectors in which the state was still not present, 
but which were considered important for the purposes of rapid industrializa-
tion. The numbers are impressive: by 1965 there were only 40 state companies. 
Between 1966 and 1975, 231 new state companies were created (Giambiagi et 
al. 2005; Martin 1985). 
The strategic goal of the military was to increase political and economic 
centralization, and to achieve this a greater role was given to state companies 
during this period. This objective was also pursued through a proliferation of 
price controls, regulatory policies, and with the financial and fiscal reforms 
(between 1964 and 1967) that provided the central government with vast re-
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sources for investment and lending, and facilitated the state’s access to the 
international capital market (Hermann 2005). 
These coordinated economic and political policies, together with a favorable 
global economic climate, resulted in Brazil experiencing, between 1968 and 
1973, a period called the “economic miracle” – an allusion to a combination of 
high growth rates (an average annual growth rate of 11.1% of GDP in real 
terms), declining inflation, and overall surpluses on the balance of payments 
(Bacha and Malan 1989). However, as the maintenance of this high growth rate 
strategy depended on the capacity of Brazil to borrow, and thus on the availa-
bility of foreign credit and favorable international trade and market conditions, 
it was seriously hit by the first oil crisis of 1973, which caused an abrupt in-
crease in international interest rates and a contraction in the global economy. 
However, despite a worsening international economic scenario, there was no 
attempt by the military government to make any structural adjustment or to 
revise their growth ambitions downward. On the contrary, a new economic 
plan was launched in 1974 (the II PND), signaling that the state had decided, 
not only to continue with a debt-led growth strategy, but to intensify the pro-
gram of import substitution industrialization with respect to capital goods and 
raw materials. Although this strategy was effective in terms of reducing Bra-
zil’s productive dependency, it also increased the country’s vulnerability to 
external shocks. After another increase in oil prices in 1979, the strategy of 
modernization from above finally became unsustainable. 
The state decision to insist on the developmental model, even if this meant 
the state bearing almost all of the costs itself,4 is a good illustration of the belief 
that the state should (and could) deal with market disequilibrium, and an ac-
knowledgment of the fact that it was the state’s role to guarantee the economic 
welfare of different political and economic interests, even if this meant incur-
ring extraordinary indebtedness. As historically the state had adopted policies 
designed to minimize possible sources of political conflict (mainly through the 
corporatist system and bureaucratic insulation), when the Brazilian economy 
almost collapsed in the 1980s, market and society actors expected the state to 
deal with the situation, like it had done in previous periods (Sallum Jr. and 
Kugelmas 1993). 
By the beginning of the 1980s, there was a complete breakdown in the de-
velopmental model first adopted in 1930, a model which had incorporated both 
change and conservatism by guaranteeing industrialization while, at the same 
time, protecting rural interests. This collapse was a result of the state strategy 
of trying to both please multiple political interests and maintain high growth 
                                                             
4  In 1980, the public sector was responsible for 80% of the Brazilian debt, whereas, in 1974, 
this value had been only 50%. See Werneck (1986) and Bacha and Malan (1990) for expla-
nations of mechanisms that made the state assume an important part of the private indebt-
edness in Brazil. 
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rates. This policy provoked a deep financial and fiscal crisis that progressively 
reduced the state’s abilities to direct and coordinate Brazil’s development in the 
same way that it had done since the Vargas era (Sola 1993). This economic 
fragility, together with an increase in the number of popular protests for a more 
democratic political arrangement, resulted in the state losing its monopoly over 
national development. 
Kohli (2005, 216) points to the fact that the choice of continuing with the 
debt-led growth model needs to be analyzed in the context of the mixed charac-
ter of the Brazilian state – “developmental, yet limited”, that constrained the 
choices available for political actors. When viewed from this standpoint, the 
state’s failure to limit external dependence was the result of the state’s histori-
cal incapacity to say no to various powerful groups when it came to limiting 
expenditures, and also to the fact that modernization from above was justified 
by its overwhelming success as an economic strategy (Sallum Jr. and Kugelmas 
1993). 
If we consider the contradictory way in which modernization from above 
came about in Brazil, it becomes clear that the very same factors that contribut-
ed to the success of the developmental model were also responsible for its 
demise. The state created by Vargas and reproduced until the 1980s had a na-
tionalist project, but was dependent on international capital and was therefore 
extremely vulnerable to external shocks; its fostering of economic moderniza-
tion created new social groups (with new demands) that only had access to 
state structures through the corporatist system (Evans 1979). The state was able 
to maintain this strategy while growth rates were high, but when the economy 
and society became more complex and the global economic scenario worsened, 
the process of modernization from above broke down. It was not possible to 
maintain the same development strategy as before. 
As we will see in Section 4, with the return to democracy in 1985, important 
economic, social and political reforms were implemented to alter the basis of 
the historical pattern of interaction between the state and the market in Brazil. 
In order to understand this period of socio-economic reforms, it is important to 
comprehend the historical process that led to the process of modernization from 
above in Brazil. This understanding will be helpful in avoiding all the simplis-
tic explanations resulting from “before-and-after” models, explanations that do 
not take into account the impact of the historical process and consider that 
Brazil either successfully adopted a purely neoliberal model in the 1990s, or, 
on the contrary, that it did not effectively implement market-oriented reforms. 
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4.  Market-Oriented Reforms: Continuities, Changes and 
Historical Dynamics (1985-2000) 
In the last 25 years, Brazil has undergone great economic, political, social and 
institutional transformations. The military regime was replaced by a civilian 
government in 1985, a new Constitution was promulgated in 1988, and direct 
Presidential elections were held for the first time in 30 years in 1989. During 
this period, the Brazilian economy was progressively opened to international 
investment and trade, many state enterprises were privatized, price controls 
were eliminated and a new economic regulatory framework was established. 
The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s represented a redefinition of the nation-
al development strategy, and transferred power from the Federal Executive to 
state and local governments, to Congress, to civil society and to the market. 
However, almost 20 years later, the general consensus is that Brazil’s approach 
to state and economic reforms, when compared to other Latin American expe-
riences, has been highly selective and gradual, with a nuanced interpretation of 
neoliberalism (Doctor 2009; Boschi 2009; Schneider 1997). The goal of this 
section is to show how an understanding of the historical process that charac-
terized modernization from above in Brazil sheds light on the argument that, 
despite de facto changes in the country’s politico-economics, there is still a 
strong influence from the state institutions formulated during the Vargas era. 
To do so, I will discuss the main economic, political and administrative chang-
es in state structures that have been attempted over the last two decades and try 
to provide new insights into the ways in which the historical perspective can 
contribute to the interpretation of this period of reforms in Brazil. 
As discussed in the previous section, from the 1930s to the 1980s, the Bra-
zilian state played a highly interventionist role in the country’s modernization 
process, not only in terms of industrial policy, but also as a direct investor, 
owner and manager of enterprises in a variety of different sectors. However, 
with the severe debt crisis of the 1980s and with the beginning of the re-
democratization process, it was clear that the national development strategy 
needed to be redefined (Bresser-Pereira 2007). At that time, neoliberalism was 
in vogue and influenced most of the state reform in Latin America. This fact, 
combined with persistent criticism of state inefficiency, government failures, 
and rent-seeking bureaucracies made the shrinking of the Brazilian state seem a 
good option. As Reis (2009) put it, “less state and more society became the 
prevailing ideology”. Moreover, the modernization discourse had moved to 
elevating the value of markets, free enterprise and internationalism, while dis-
paraging state interventionism as outdated and ineffective (Diniz 2008). 
In Brazil, the most effective market-oriented reforms in the 1990s were the 
programs of trade liberalization and privatization. The Brazilian government 
started opening markets in the late 1980s through a steady, continuous reduc-
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tion in import taxes (the average import tax was reduced from 130% in 1987 to 
15% in 1994) and the removal of many other controls and barriers to imported 
goods (Barros de Castro 2005). The goal of trade liberalization policies was to 
stimulate the competitiveness and efficiency of Brazilian companies that had 
been historically protected by the state (increasing the diversity of consumer 
goods available), and to help reduce inflation (Pinheiro, Bonelli and Schneider 
2004). 
The opening of the Brazilian economy is considered by many authors to be 
the dynamic that provoked the most profound changes ever in state actions and 
strategies. In this new situation, the Brazilian state had to move away from 
inwardly-oriented development policies and extensive formalized state plan-
ning. It now had to deal with the challenges of the modern knowledge-based 
globalized economy and had to adapt its strategies to accommodate interna-
tional market oscillations – a completely different scenario from that of previ-
ous decades (Doktor 2009; Boschi 2010a; Evans 2008). 
The second main change in the national development strategy was the intro-
duction of a privatization program in the governments of President Fernando 
Collor de Mello (1990-92), Itamar Franco (1993-94) and President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). Many of the state-owned enterprises control-
ling Brazil’s economic infrastructure, including state banks and energy, trans-
portation and communications enterprises, were sold off during this period.5 As 
a result, the 1990s saw a massive restructuring of industry and deep structural 
changes in Brazilian capitalism (Barros de Castro 2005). 
Despite these important changes in the economic sphere, certain forms of 
state intervention continued unabated in Brazil. Many authors have pointed to 
the major role still played by some state institutions and enterprises, such as 
BNDES and Petrobrás, in allowing the state to directly influence market dy-
namics and thus decisively impact Brazil’s national development. BNDES, for 
example, is still the main provider of long term credit to Brazilian companies, 
and has been effective as an instrument of macro-economic policy (Boschi 
2010b). Furthermore, state resources continue to play a central role in stimulat-
ing training schemes for the labor market, in promoting technological devel-
opment and in settling capital and labor conflicts (Boschi 2010a). 
The same dynamics of change and continuity could be observed in the polit-
ical and administrative spheres following attempts at state reform in the 1990s. 
In the political sphere, such reforms included decentralization, modifications in 
the Federal Executive’s prerogatives and alterations in the corporatist structure, 
                                                             
5  The privatization process was timidly initiated. Between 1990 and 1994, 33 federal compa-
nies, with total revenue of US$ 8.6 billion, were sold. Under Cardoso, it received a boost, 
and 170 companies were sold, worth more than US$ 100 billion in revenues (Giambiagi and 
Além 2001). 
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all of which had the goal of transforming the former political power structure 
that had characterized Brazil’s modernization path until the 1980s. 
Political and fiscal decentralization was focused on the need to restructure 
intergovernmental relationships, by granting more fiscal autonomy and deci-
sion-making capacity to states and municipalities (Arretche 1996). Although it 
is undeniable that the decentralization program was successful in its fiscal and 
tax objectives, by allowing for the greater independence of local governments 
(Giambiagi and Além 2001), it advanced irregularly in different issue areas 
(Almeida 1995; Melo 1993, 1998; Arretche 1996). A common criticism of the 
way decentralization was implemented in Brazil is that it depended heavily on 
incentives and on federal government control of local governments, and that it 
had not advanced in important areas, such as social security. 
Another important development that changed the basis of the historical in-
teraction between the state and the market in Brazil was the rising importance 
of Congress and the Judiciary in decision-making and regulatory processes, and 
the increased power of mechanisms of control over public administration, 
including the important role played by the Ministério Público in this process 
(Abrucio 2007; Vianna 2002). Likewise, the new social and political demands 
engendered by democratization meant that different actors could participate in 
public policy decision-making (including federal and state deputies, trade un-
ions, mayors and state governors), thus reducing the state’s autonomy (Sola 
1993). However, despite these political-institutional changes, authors point to 
the permanence of the Federal Executive in its role as the principal interlocutor 
of interest groups and controller of macro-economic policy as being one of the 
constants in Brazil’s politico-economics (Boschi and Lima 2003). Moreover, 
important institutional mechanisms still guaranteed the concentration of a lot of 
power in the Presidency, thus allowing the Federal Executive to directly influ-
ence the developmental agenda (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; Melo 2004). 
With respect to changes in the corporatist structure, debate in the literature is 
highly polemic as to whether the 1988 Constitution was effective in imple-
menting a more pluralistic system of interest representation in Brazil or not. On 
the one hand, the new legislation guaranteed more independent representation 
by reintroducing the principle of freedom of association and organization in 
Brazilian unions, and by guaranteeing more participation for labor unions in 
key national public policy forums (Almeida 2004, Boschi 2010a). These ac-
tions reduced the state’s social control over interest groups by reducing its 
monopoly with respect to decision-making. On the other hand, some controls 
over independent representation were maintained, such as the single trade 
union principle, compliance with occupational categories for establishing a 
trade union, the hierarchical system of organization of unions, and mandatory 
contributions. The system, as outlined in the CLT, still exists in Brazil (Vianna 
and Burgos 2010; Boito 1994), and these measures indicate that the state still 
has considerable influence over social groups. 
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Finally, in the administrative sphere, different measures were taken to pro-
vide a more efficient and flexible state machine, and to limit state intervention 
in sectors considered strategic, such as central banking, planning and budgeting 
(Nunes et al. 2007; Abrucio 2007; Bresser-Pereira 1999). Among the main 
innovations proposed in the administrative reform were the transformation of 
foundations and autarchies into social organizations and executive agencies, the 
creation of regulatory agencies, the institutionalization of administrative per-
formance policies, and more accountability and transparency in state activities. 
However, many of these proposed innovations were not fully developed in 
practice (for example, only one executive agency, INMETRO, has been creat-
ed). Likewise, there is still a lot of uncertainty as to the role of regulatory agen-
cies. They are criticized for their lack of accountability and for not being effec-
tive in implementing their decisions in some sectors, such as civil aviation and 
energy (Reis 2009; Mello and Anuatti 2008; Pessoa 2010; Cruz 2007). 
The fact that the Brazilian state, even after the market-oriented reforms of 
the 1990s, has never adopted a fully liberal ideal can only be understood if we 
consider that state-led development has been a success story in Brazil. It is 
under state leadership that Brazilian society has been modernized and has 
maintained a long period of sustained growth. For almost 60 years, state-based 
capitalism was uncontested by society. In other words, since the Brazilian 
modernization process and the establishment of a national state occurred simul-
taneously (and to the detriment of autonomous market and civil society devel-
opment), attempts to change the country’s national development strategy will 
always be limited by the power of state authority and by the fact that political 
actions and beliefs of the old model are deeply institutionalized (Reis 1998; 
Almeida 1999). 
In this sense, the understanding of how modernization from above unfolded 
in Brazil sheds light on the interaction between the changes and continuities in 
the political and economic institutions highlighted in the literature. Firstly, the 
maintenance of some patterns, mainly in the corporatist structure, needs to be 
understood as being part of a historical trend of institutional adaptation to polit-
ical and economic changes (Boschi 2010a). As we saw in the previous section, 
corporatism was one of the main factors that made active re-creation of mod-
ernization from above possible. This long-lived permanence cannot be dissoci-
ated from how important the corporatist structure was to different actors in 
different periods: during dictatorial regimes it was used as an important state 
instrument of social control, and, during democratic times, social groups used it 
to gain direct access to state structures (Almeida 2004; Cruz 2007). From this 
viewpoint, it makes sense to suppose that the corporatist structure could be 
adapted to a new socio-economic order, and still be of fundamental importance 
for the maintenance of specific political coalitions. The same rationale can be 
used to analyze other institutional resiliencies observed after the 1990s reforms, 
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such as the central role still played by BNDES and other state institutions and 
enterprises. 
The use of concepts derived from path-dependency theory also helps to ex-
plain some difficulties encountered in implementing a more complete state 
reform policy in the 1990s. During this period, state interventionism was al-
ready an institutionalized tradition in Brazil, and, as such, political actors de-
signed their strategies and actions using this historical reference, even if their 
intention was to change the current situation (Diniz and Boschi 2004). If we 
accept that conceptions in the political world are difficult to change, then it 
becomes clear that the idea that it was the state’s obligation to define and sup-
port its national strategic interest in development constrained any possible 
reform proposals and their implementation (Pierson 2004). 
Other forces of path continuity might have played an important role in limit-
ing the scope of change during the period of reforms in the 1990s. Simply put, 
continuity in politico-economic arrangements usually results from high trans-
formation costs, the inertia of action, disagreement among policy-makers and 
power relations that propel political economies along their ‘paths’ (Becker 
2009). In this sense, since the Brazilian modern economy has historically given 
priority to state resources over market mechanisms, coordination effects that 
reinforce this pattern are widespread (since formal and informal arrangements 
that help to structure interaction between market and state are intricately 
linked) and adaptive expectations make it difficult to change this situation, 
since particular courses of action are encouraged or discouraged because of the 
anticipated actions of others. 
Finally, matters of timing, sequence and the specific content of the reforms 
were of central importance in determining reform outcomes, and are central in 
understanding the desultory approach towards state reform in Brazil discussed 
in the literature (Melo 1998; Doktor 2009). Both historical sociology and path-
dependence theories depart from the understanding that acknowledgement of 
when an event occurs may be of crucial importance in understanding its results. 
With respect to market-oriented reforms, for example, it is clear that the fact 
that democracy preceded attempts to stabilize the economy had important con-
sequences, because it empowered actors who could offer resistance to econom-
ic reforms. In other Latin American countries, such as Chile and Argentina, 
where market-oriented reforms started to be implemented under dictatorship 
regimes, this different timing directly influenced the effectiveness and types of 
policies implemented. 
5.  Final Remarks 
The historical reconstruction of the relationship between the state and the mar-
ket in Brazil that I have presented in this paper is intended to show the gains to 
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be had by combining the strong points of historical sociology and path-
dependence. 
Inspired by Bendix’s approach, with respect to the period of state leadership 
in question (1930-1985), I highlighted the main economic, political and admin-
istrative factors that made possible the re-creation of the understanding that 
only the state could be the architect of the country’s economic modernization. 
Departing from the idea that state-building itself has to be understood as a 
continuous process if one is to avoid inadequate reductionisms in explaining 
phenomena that concern both state and society (Reis 1979), I showed how 
modernization from above institutionalized practices and beliefs with respect to 
the appropriate role of the state, and how these practices and beliefs decisively 
restricted the negotiation of policies and the extent to which state reforms could 
be successfully implemented. 
I also showed that trade liberalization, privatization and political and admin-
istrative decentralization imposed de facto changes on the relationship between 
the state and the market in Brazil. Today, the state has to adapt its actions to 
international market oscillations and demands, and can no longer independently 
determine Brazil’s national development strategies. However, these changes 
interact with relevant continuities that allow the state to retain a decisive influ-
ence over the economic sphere, such as the maintenance of (i) Federal Execu-
tive decision-making power, (ii) some insulated bureaucracies and (iii) the 
corporatist structure. 
Interpretations of historical changes and continuities depend, to a considera-
ble extent, on intellectual concerns as well as on the basic theoretical frame-
work employed by the analyst (Pierson 2003, 189). In this paper, I was less 
worried about finding a definitive answer to the question of why Brazil did not 
fully adopt neoliberal policies in the 1990s, and more concerned with propos-
ing a possible historical logic that could be used to interpret 70 years of politi-
co-economics in Brazil. To do this, I focused on the diverse ways in which 
changes and continuities interacted in different periods, and demonstrated how 
historical sociology and path-dependence can help us to understand the current 
coexistence of old and new elements in the relationship between the state and 
the market in Brazil. 
I strongly believe that the historical perspective, which is normally used to 
try to understand how the past influences the present, or to analyze how rele-
vant social and political processes unfold over time, can also be extremely 
valuable in discussing the viability of future political arrangements and, main-
ly, the challenges involved in transforming the Brazilian state. As Evans (2008, 
18) aptly put it, the search for the 21st century developmental state requires an 
appreciation of how the historical character of development is changing, and 
for this we need to understand the unique historical difficulties that the Brazili-
an state faces in becoming “agile, active, resourceful and able to act inde-
pendently of private interests” – requirements of the new developmental state. 
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